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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
THE SNP BUDGET FOR SCOTLAND - A COMMENT 
by Jim Stevens, Fraser of AUander Institute, University Of Strathclyde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the note is to set out an assessment 
of the recently published SNP Budget programme, 
'Yes We Can', SNP (1997). The essentials of the 
SNP budget calculations are set out in Table 1, the 
'Original SNP Scenario' which sets out the impact 
of 3 distinguishable forces:-
The fiscal benefits to Scodand of breaking 
out of the United Kingdom. In the 
analysis, this is obscurely termed the 
"Relative Fiscal Surplus with the UK 
(including North Sea Oil)'. In fact, it is or 
should be the borrowing/surplus 
implications of ScoUand being an 
independent country following the same 
fiscal regime as the current UK 
government. Scotland is assumed to 
receive 90% of UK North Sea Oil 
Revenues. The SNP approach indicates 
that there will be a cumulative budget 
surplus of £10.7bn, allowing substantial 
debt repayment. 
Gains from independence. The analysis 
argues that Scottish growth will be 0.4% 
per annum higher outside the union as 
compared with the status quo over the 4 
year forecast horizon. The analysis is 
provided for the SNP by MacKay 
Consultants. 
An expansionary Budget injecting a net 
£5.99bn into the Scottish economy over 
the 4 year forecast horizon and 
contributing to die higher growth forecast 
for the SNP by MacKay Consultants. This 
engenders a reduction in unemployment of 
108,500 over 4 years, modest public 
expenditure savings and revenue gains and 
significant repayment of Scottish national 
debt. All of tiiis is achieved with no 
serious inflationary consequences although 
Scottish inflation rises from 2.4% pa in 
1997/98 to 3V4%pa in both 1999/00 and 
2000/01. 
This paper will critically examine tfiis set of 
assumptions and reassess the costs of separation 
within die framework employed by the SNP. 
Section 2 examines whether there will be gains 
from independence and re-estimates the SNP 
budget. In addition, we comment on the SNP view 
that Scodand has contributed £27bn to the UK 
exchequer since 1979. Section 3 assesses the view 
that mere will be increased growth following 
independence. This is not the position that most 
economists would hold and the figures are reworked 
on the still optimistic basis that separation would be 
neutral widi respect to economic activity. Section 4 
provides an overview and sets out our conclusions. 
2. SCOTLAND'S TRUE FISCAL 
POSITION 
The coherence of the SNP budget relies on the 
estimates of the fiscal surplus/deficit arising from 
Scodand leaving the UK. In dieir analysis, the SNP 
use die 'relative fiscal surplus with the UK as the 
basis for their fiscal projection which is an 
inappropriate procedure. To establish this we set out 
how mis magnitude is defined and measured. The 
'relative fiscal surplus widi die UK' is calculated 
through a 3 stage procedure. 
First, Scodand's fiscal position is established on the 
basis that an independent Scodand follows die same 
expenditure and revenue policies as me UK 
government These are set out in the Financial 
Statement and Budget Report (Redbook) 1997/98. 
The SNP approach is to assume that Scodand will 
account for 17.9% of me UK public sector deficit 
(excluding Norm Sea oil revenues and Privatisation 
Proceeds [PPs]). This yields a Scottish deficit, 
excluding oil, lo which 90% of North Sea revenues 
and population share of UK Privatisation Proceeds 
can be added. It is estimated tiiat mis results in a 
cumulative surplus of £7bn over the 1997/98 to 
2000/01 period. (SNP I997:pp26). 
Second, die SNP add in a population share of die 
UK public sector deficit. This procedure is 
employed to indicate "the extent to which 
Scodand's public finances are 'better off man the 
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UK average" (ibid:pp26). This results in a 
cumulative surplus over the 4 year period of £2.5bn 
yielding a relative surplus of £9.5bn. 
Third, the SNP adjust the Scottish share of the UK 
deficit to account for the fact that the Treasury 
estimate of 17.9% is "a gross underestimate of the 
revenues raised from Scotland and an overestimate 
of spending in Scotland" (ibid:pp27). This yields a 
further cumulative surplus of £l.2bn and results in 
a cumulative overall budget surplus of £10.7bn over 
the 1997/98 to 2000/01 period. 
Whilst it is possible to question aspects of all 3 
elements, we will concentrate on the use of a 
constant share of the UK deficit as a forecasting 
device and the addition of population share of the 
UK public sector deficit-
a) Use of a constant 17.9% share of the 
UK deficit in forecasting Scotland's 
Fiscal Position. 
The source of the 17.9% share of the UK deficit is 
a Parliamentary answer provided by the Treasury 
which adjusts and updates the 17.1% share 
estimated in by Scottish Office economists in 
Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland: 
1994/95 (GERS) (HMSO October 1996). However, 
use of such a number to project Scotland's fiscal 
position backwards and forwards is a flawed and 
erroneous procedure. 
Assessments of the Scottish public finances in the 
1990s have been made by PffiDA (1992), Stevens 
(1995), and Scottish Office (1995,1996). These 
conclude that Scotland's share of UK expenditure is 
significantly above it's revenue share. This suggests 
that Scotland has a structural deficit. Thus, if the 
UK deficit falls to zero, as projected by the 
Treasury, Scotland would still have a budget deficit. 
UK spending and revenue would be equal but 
Scotland's share of expenditure would still be above 
it's share of revenue. For example, in the recent 
GERS document, Scotland accounts for 10V4% of 
UK expenditure and 8.9% of UK revenues, 
excluding North Sea revenue. Thus, Scotland would 
have a deficit equivalent to 1.35% of UK revenue 
or expenditure if the UK books balanced. 
If Scotland has a structural deficit, the Scouish 
share of the UK General Government Borrowing 
Requirement (GGBR) should rise as the UK GGBR 
falls towards a surplus. A recent parliamentary 
answer has set out Treasury and Scottish Office 
estimates of Scotland's share of the UK GGBR. 
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These are presented in Appendix Table A6 and are 
obtained from Hansard, 21st March 1997, Col 969. 
This data highlights that Scotland's share of the UK 
GGBR (ex Oil and Privatisation receipts) rises 
sharply in 1987/88 and 1990/91 when the UK 
GGBR (exc Oil And PPs) was relatively small. This 
evidence strongly supports the yearly analyses 
which estimate that Scotland has a structural deficit 
In addition, Scotland's share of the UK deficit is 
consistently above it's population share which is 
another indication that a structural deficit exists. 
The SNP approach of rolling backwards and 
forwards Scodand's share of the UK deficit 
implicitly disinvents the fact that most independent 
analysts and official evidence suggests that we have 
a structural deficit with or without North Sea 
revenue. Under the SNP approach, if the UK deficit 
falls to zero then Scotland's share falls to zero and 
when the UK is in surplus, Scodand is in surplus. 
This flies in the face of all of the evidence on 
ScoUand's financial position within the UK. In light 
of this, our analysis will estimate die deficit for the 
1997-2001 period by using Scodand's 1994/95 
share of UK revenue and expenditure, as set out in 
Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland 
1994/95. (HMSO 1996). 
Some in political and journalistic circles may 
complain that this is an acceptance of Tory fiddled 
figures'. However, such comments betray a woeful 
ignorance of the difference between civil servants 
and their political masters. The GERS analysis is 
conducted by Scottish Office economists and would 
be invariant as to whether it is Mr Forsyth, Mr 
Robertson, Mr Wallace or Mr Salmond in charge at 
St. Andrews House. It is a puerile slur on the 
professional integrity of government economists to 
suggest otiierwise. 
b) Adding in a population share of the UK 
Public Sector Deficit. 
This is a wholly unwarranted procedure in the 
context of the present exercise. If one has estimates 
of Scotland's budget deficit and the UK is also in 
deficit, then adding in a population share of the UK 
deficit would provide some indication of the 
structural deficit. If die Scottish deficit is £5bn and 
population share of the UK deficit is £4m this 
suggests that Scotland has a structural deficit of 
£lm. 
However, in assessing Scotland's fiscal prospects, 
the correct procedure is to establish estimates of die 
cost of supplying the public services enjoyed by the 
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Scottish people and the tax and other government 
revenues raised. This is what is achieved in the first 
step by use of a constant 17.9% share. Whilst 
adding back in population share of the UK deficit 
provides an estimate of how affordable the budget 
is relative to the UK, it is of little relevance to how 
much taxes or borrowing would actually have to 
rise to finance the financial programmes of an 
independent Scotland. It is the absolute surplus or 
deficit which is relevant for these calculations and 
not the relative surplus or deficit. For this reason, 
the favourable £2.5bn adjustment to Scotland's 
fiscal position is not warranted. 
c) The Absolute Fiscal Surplus 
Table A1-A4 set out an analysis of the true Scottish 
fiscal position for the 1997/98 to 2000/01 period. 
To facilitate comparison with the SNP analysis, all 
data are in current prices. The UK expenditure and 
revenue figures in Table Al are obtained from the 
1997/98 'Redbook (HMSO Nov. 1996). UK North 
Sea Revenue and Privatisation Proceeds are 
obtained from Hansard, 6th February 1997, Col 682 
and are consistent with the SNP assumptions. The 
SNP argues that Scotland's share of oil revenues for 
the 1997-2001 period is £13.7bn. (Ibid: pp27). This 
constitutes 90% of UK revenues which are thus 
estimated at £15.2bn which is identical to the UK 
Treasury forecasts. 
Table Al indicates that the overall UK GGBR 
declines rapidly over the period and moves into a 
£7bn surplus in 2000/01. Over the 4 year period, 
the cumulative UK GGBR, including oil revenues 
and pps, is estimated at £28.4bn. Table A2 presents 
the UK fiscal position excluding North Sea oil and 
privatisation proceeds. When these revenue sources 
are excluded, the UK GGBR rises sharply with a 
cumulative deficit of £49.1bn evident in the 1997-
2001 period. 
Table A3 sets out our estimates of Scottish revenue 
and expenditure, excluding oil receipts and 
privatisation proceeds. The Scottish expenditure and 
revenue figures are obtained by assuming that 
Scotland accounts for 1014% of UK expenditure and 
8.9% of UK revenues. This approach indicates that 
Scotland has a cumulative deficit of £21.6bn over 
the 4 year period. The less satisfactory SNP 
procedure of taking 17.9% of the UK total results 
in a cumulative deficit of £8.8bn. 
Table A4 adds in 90% of UK oil revenues and 
population share of UK privatisation proceeds to the 
Scottish figures and indicates the fiscal 
consequences of separation on the public finances 
to be as follows 
Year 
97/98 
98/99 
99/00 
00/01 
Total 
Deficit 
£2.5bn 
£2.1bn 
£1.8bn 
£1.0bn 
£7.4bn 
These deficits are an estimate of the fiscal 
consequences of breaking out of the UK and 
experiencing the same pattern of economic activity 
as would have occurred within the Union assuming 
that Scotland will be due 90% of UK oil revenues. 
They are based on the assumption that the 
Government of an independent Scotland pursues the 
same deflationary fiscal approach as that set out by 
the UK Conservative administration in the current 
Redbook. Over the 4 year forecast horizon, the 
estimated fiscal shortfall is equivalent to an average 
increase of circa 12V4p on the standard rate of 
income tax in Scotland. 
In order to provide the same level of service to the 
Scottish people and impose the same tax regime on 
the Scottish business and personal sectors as the 
former and present UK Government, an 
independent Scotland would require to borrow a 
cumulative total of £7.4bn. This contrasts markedly 
with estimates employing the SNP 17.9% approach. 
Using that procedure, we estimate that Scotland 
would have a cumulative surplus of £5.4bn which 
is lower than the SNP calculation that Scotland 
would derive a cumulative fiscal surplus of £7bn 
(op cit: pp26). This discrepancy may be due to the 
use of different projections of UK revenue and 
expenditure although the sources for both analyses 
appear to be the same. However, the key conclusion 
of this section is that, even with 90% of UK oil 
revenues, we would require to tax more or borrow 
more in order to consume the same level of public 
services that we are projected to receive inside the 
Union. 
d) Did Scotland have a Budget Surplus in 
the 1980s with a 90% share of UK oil 
revenues? 
As a further exercise, we used the Treasury and 
Scottish Office estimates of the share of the UK 
GGBR (ex oil and privatisation proceeds) to project 
the Scottish fiscal deficit for the 1979/80 to 1994/95 
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period. The analysis is presented in Table A5. 
Estimates of the Scottish deficit for 1988/89 and 
1989/90 are based on Scodand contributing 
population share of UK fiscal receipts (ex oil 
revenues) and 10V4% of UK public spending (ex 
privatisation receipts). After adding back 90% of oil 
revenues and population share of privatisation 
proceeds, Scodand is estimated to have a 
cumulative surplus of £6.6bn in current prices and 
£26.5bn in 1996/97 prices. 
Table A6 sets out a similar analysis using a 
constant 17.9% share of the UK GGBR (ex oil and 
privatisation proceeds) in each year. After adding 
back Scotland's share of oil and privatisation 
revenues, a cumulative surplus of £11.2bn in 
current prices or £31.2bn in 1996/97 prices is 
obtained. 
Recent work by Scottish office economists confirms 
that Scotland has experienced a real fiscal surplus 
of £31bn since 1979/80. We should be grateful to 
the SNP for teasing this information out of the 
'Whitehall system'. However, we should be careful 
of both the small print and of the significance of 
such findings for the late 1990s and beyond. 
It should be noted that, on either assessment, the 
cumulative surplus derives from the 1983/84 to 
1985/86 period. If these years are excluded, then 
the cumulative surplus disappears. Second, Scotland 
has experienced a deficit in every year since 
1990/91, even when 90% of oil revenues are 
included. Indeed, a deficit would occur in each year 
if Scotland retained all UK oil revenues. Although 
Scotland did contribute to the UK exchequer across 
the 1980's, the bulk of this contribution arises in a 
3 year period when real oil prices were high and 
the petroleum revenue tax (PRT) take per barrel of 
oil was greater than at present. At present, oil 
revenues are modest at a time when oil and gas 
production in the North Sea is at record levels. The 
days of huge oil revenues are gone and realistic 
projections of the oil market suggest that we'll 
never see their like again. 
Three further points can be made. First, the 
surpluses set out in Appendix Tables 5 and 6 across 
the 1980's relate to Scotland being part of the UK. 
In an independent Scotland, oil would be a 
significant part of GDP. Analysis of the regional 
accounts suggests that oil output as a share of 
Scottish GDP, including 90% of UK oil production 
would be as follows. 
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Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Oil output as a % of 
Scottish GDP, including oil 
28.1 
35.0 
40.3 
41.7 
43.5 
46.8 
43.3 
24.0 
24.7 
17.3 
15.3 
14.9 
It is highly likely mat such an economy would have 
been subject to strong upward pressure on it's 
currency in the 1980-86 period when real oil prices 
were high. This would have crowded out domestic 
activity by making exports uncompetitive and 
imports relatively cheap. It is equally likely that the 
Scottish currency would have plummeted when the 
oil price collapsed in 1986. 
It is likely that an independent Scodand would have 
contracted an acute form of 'Dutch disease' in the 
1980's and that economic management would have 
been extremely difficult. A souring Scottish petro 
currency would have engendered both reduced non 
oil government revenue and increased government 
expenditure as non oil domestic output and 
employment fell. Thus, the surplus achieved as part 
of the UK currency area would not be achievable 
with a separate Scottish currency and the fiscal 
position would be more adverse than suggested by 
the favourable position inside the Union. 
Second, the oil supported fiscal surpluses of the 
1980's have been absorbed into die UK Treasury 
and used to support welfare spending. Outside the 
UK, these are a sunk cost to having belonged to the 
Union in that period. The only way this transfer of 
Scottish resources can be redeemed is by staying 
inside the UK and seeking to use mis as an 
argument to protect Scotland's currently favourable 
expenditure settlement. Although it is possible to 
admire the way the SNP have dragged this 
assessment out of die UK Treasury via intrepid use 
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of Parliamentary Questions, the SNP may have 
provided political ammunition to their opponents by 
exposing 31 billion good reasons for staying inside 
the Union. 
Third, whilst the use of a constant 17.9% share of 
the UK GGBR (ex oil and privatisation receipts) 
may have provided a reasonable estimator of the 
underlying fiscal position between 1979-95, it is not 
appropriate for projecting across the 1997-2001 
period. The true average deficit share would 
provide a correct measure of the cumulative budget 
if applied to the deficit for each year the average 
was derived from. This is an arithmetical truism. 
The SNP used a 17.9% figure supplied by the UK 
Treasury. The SNP results are accurate because 
17.9% was close to the actual average deficit for 
the 1979-95 period. This does not mean that using 
such approach to predict a short period is a valid 
procedure. 
This is because this approach ignores the strong 
evidence that Scotland has a structural deficit In 
the forecast horizon, the UK GGBR is set to move 
into surplus. The structural deficit result means that 
Scottish share of the UK deficit would increase as 
the UK moves into balance. If and when the UK 
moves into surplus, Scotland would still experience 
a deficit until the UK surplus increased 
substantially. This is what happened in the late 
1980s when the UK budget moved in and out of 
surplus, as set out in Table A5. In short, the fact 
that the SNP deficit share approach worked well for 
1979-1995 does not mean that it is appropriate for 
the coming period. All the evidence points the other 
way! 
e) The Fiscal Implications of the SNP 
Budget. 
Our assessment of the true fiscal implications of 
separation is plugged into the SNP budget 
projections and presented in Table 2, 'The Scottish 
Office Fiscal Balance Scenario'. This assumes that 
Scotland accounts for 8.9% of UK revenue (ex oil 
receipts) and 10.3% of UK spending (ex 
privatisation proceeds) and that 90% of projected 
UK oil revenue and population share of UK asset 
sales accrue to Scotland. In addition, we remove 
any interest savings from debt repayment as this 
simply won't happen. Over the 4 years, the bill for 
independence and the expansionary fiscal policy is 
estimated to be £11.7bn. On the assumption that 
this is borrowed at 4%, the resulting Scottish 
borrowing requirement is £12.0bn or an average of 
20p on the standard rate of income tax over the 
1997-2001 period. 
As set out above, the SNP dispute the Scottish 
Office expenditure and revenue shares and estimate 
that this causes an inflation of the deficit by £1.2bn 
over 4 years. Without endorsing these calculations 
and as an exercise, we adjust our fiscal deficit to 
account for this. As you would expect, the 
cumulative deficit falls to £10.8bn which represents 
an average increase of 17.8p on the Scottish 
standard income tax rate. 
3. QUESTIONING THE GROWTH 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The SNP utilise an analysis by MacKay consultants 
which purports to show that Scottish growth will be 
faster after independence. Such a conclusion is a 
triumph of assertion over analysis. Whilst there may 
be modest gains from independence in terms of the 
media in Glasgow, the public and diplomatic sector 
in Edinburgh and the oil sector in Grampian, most 
of these gains are achievable inside the Union, 
given devolution. In the case of oil in Grampian, it 
is only recently that SNP leader, Alex Salmond, 
was arguing that such spin offs would arise if the 
UK Government dispersed a few civil servants to 
Aberdeen. 
Whilst it is not necessary to have separation to 
realise such gains, most economists would argue 
that the costs and uncertainties of breaking out of 
the UK, establishing a Scottish currency and 
gaining credibility with the financial markets would 
far outweigh any benefits. When the original 
MacKay analysis was published by the SNP, such 
a view was put by Professor Anton Muscatelli of 
Glasgow University in an interview with Brian 
Taylor for Reporting Scotland. Professor Muscatelli 
is speaking for the majority of economists who 
would take the view that non oil Scottish GDP 
growth would be slower following independence 
compared with Scotland remaining part of the UK. 
In addition, it is our view that the process of setting 
up a new state, complete with a separate currency 
would present problems that cannot be dealt with in 
existing models of the Scottish economy. For that 
reason, the Fraser of Allander Institute has always 
resisted doing such exercises on their suite of 
Scottish models. These models contain data and 
relationships based on Scotland being part of the 
UK currency area and would not handle well such 
a radical step as separation. 
For the purposes of this paper, we next assume that 
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independence and the fiscal stimulus proposed by 
the SNP has a neutral effect on Scottish growth and 
employment We view this as a hopelessly 
optimistic scenario but will run with it. In terms of 
the SNP budget, this means that there will be no 
savings from reduced unemployment or no 
increased corporation tax revenues. In addition, one 
could adjust other personal and business tax 
projections to account for slower than forecast 
growth. However, we do not have knowledge of the 
assumptions used to derive the SNP estimates and, 
since the effects are small, we abstract from them. 
The results of the neutral growth scenario are set 
out in Table 3. This indicates that the true bill for 
Scottish independence and the expansionary SNP 
budget is £13.1bn over 4 years. If this is borrowed 
for then a further £403.8m of interest payments 
(@4% pa) have to be found. Thus, the final cost of 
separation and the SNP fiscal measures would be a 
cumulative deficit of £13V£bn which is equivalent to 
an average rise of 22.3p in the standard rate of 
income tax in Scotland. The adjustment for the 
dubious SNP view that the official expenditure and 
revenue estimates shortchange Scotland yields a 
deficit of £11.9 bn or 20V4p on the standard rate. 
Clearly, our own view is that Scottish independence 
would lead to slower growth than otherwise over 
the 4 year horizon and beyond. The fiscal 
implications are more adverse than set out in the 
above scenario but we make no attempt to quantify 
this. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis in this paper casts serious doubt on the 
coherence of the SNP budget for an independent 
Scotland and their assessment of our short run 
prospects. The affordability of their programme 
hangs round an estimate that Scodand presently has 
a fiscal surplus within the UK. The SNP approach 
to estimating our true budgetary position is flawed 
on 2 major counts. 
First, the SNP use a 17.9% constant share of the 
projected UK fiscal deficit to establish Scotland's 
fiscal deficit. The approach is wrong because it 
assumes that, as the UK deficit falls to zero and 
moves into surplus, Scotland's fiscal deficit falls to 
zero and moves into surplus. This ignores a wealth 
of evidence from official independent sources that 
Scotland's share of UK spending is higher than our 
share of UK revenue and that Scotland has a 
structural deficit. Thus, as the UK public accounts 
move into balance and surplus, Scotland will still 
have a budget deficit. Projections of Scotland's 
fiscal position made using estimates of our UK 
revenue and expenditure share indicate that 
ScoUand has a cumulative deficit of £7.4bn in the 
1997-2001 period. This contrasts markedly with the 
SNP estimate of a £7bn surplus. By using an 
inappropriate forecasting method the SNP thus 
inflate Scotland's true fiscal position by £14.4bn, 
over the forecast horizon. 
Second, the SNP inappropriately use a measure of 
ScoUand's relative fiscal surplus with the UK as a 
basis for their budget projections. This approach is 
completely wrong because it is the absolute surplus 
or deficit which is relevant to the costing of our 
fiscal position post independence. The effect of this 
is to further and erroneously enhance our fiscal 
position by £2.5bn over the next 4 years. 
Because of these flawed procedures and assumption, 
the SNP budget surplus within the UK is inflated 
by a total of £16.9bn. In addition, the SNP believe 
that a further £1.2bn should be added in because 
Scotland's budget deficit is overstated by the 
approach taken by the Scottish Office and Treasury. 
This is highly questionable. In all, the SNP budget 
forecast is grounded on a projection of Scotland's 
fiscal position which includes £18.1bn of revenue 
which quite simply does not exist. The fiscal 
bonanza that the SNP propose to shower on the 
Scottish people is due to inappropriate forecasting 
and public accounting procedures. 
The nationalists may counter that their assumptions 
are as good as the method applied here. Given the 
scientific evidence available from official and other 
sources this is clearly not the case. The approach 
adopted in this paper better captures the underlying 
features of Scottish spending and tax revenues. 
However, both approaches are flawed but both are 
transparent and we would be prepared to respect the 
view of fellow economists and informed 
commentators as to which was more satisfactory. 
We have little doubt as to what the result of any 
canvas of opinion would be! 
Post independence, if the SNP budget measures 
were pursued and if we managed to do as well as 
we would have done inside die Union, Scotland 
would have a minimum fiscal deficit in each of the 
4 years in the 1997-2001 period of £3.0bn. Given 
other likely adverse consequences to separation, this 
is likely to be substantially higher. In either case, 
Scodand would not meet the Debt/GDP or 
PSBR/GDP criteria set down in the Maastricht 
Treaty. To take part in EMU, an independent 
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Scotland would be under pressure to scale down 
public spending and increase the tax burden on both 
the personal and corporate sector. It is evident that 
the budget proposed by the nationalists simply 
could not be pursued if an independent Scotland 
wished to prepare for EMU. 
Our view is that post independence, Scotland would 
have initial annual budget deficits in the region of 
7-10% of GDP. This is an obstacle to independence 
but is one which could be coped with given some 
fiscal pain. What we find questionable is the 
consistent attempts by the SNP to present separation 
as a no lose bet for Scotland. The true case for 
independence is that it would be difficult for us 
initially and that economic performance would 
suffer but that this has to be set against the possible 
long run political and economic benefits which may 
derive from our ability to pursue our own 
distinctive national policies. 
However, in a world increasingly characterised by 
globalization, financial and political integration, it 
is far from clear that the scope to pursue 
independent monetary and fiscal policies designed 
to boost Scottish output and employment really 
exists. Separation does not result in windfall gains 
which allow the pursuit of enhanced supply side 
policies and better social provision. A devolved 
parliament would be both empowered and better 
placed financially to pursue the type of supply side 
policies which can improve our long run growth 
performance. With separation, there will be pain for 
very little additional long run gain. 
Analysis of the SNP document indicates a desire to 
create a fairer society and more efficient and 
productive economy. These are commendable and 
noble objectives. However, to pretend that there are 
pots of money to throw at Scotland's manifest 
economic and social problems is clearly false. The 
SNP appear not to appreciate that such suspect 
analyses are liable to be construed by political 
opponents, with some justification, as a cruel 
charade perpetrated against the poor, the sick, the 
unemployed and the disadvantaged. In an 
independent Scotland, there will be little scope for 
the degree of public largesse proposed by the SNP. 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the SNP's 
view of our fiscal prospects is ludicrously optimistic 
and fatally flawed. The fact that we had a fiscal 
surplus in the 1980s does not mean that we will 
have such a boon at the end of the millennium and 
beyond. To maintain government spending and tax 
plans in the coming period we would engender 
annual deficits that 90% of oil revenues does not 
cover. Separation provides no economic and fiscal 
panacea. Oil revenue will endure for a long time 
but on a declining trend and would not be sufficient 
to ensure that we did not have to borrow more or 
tax more to enjoy the same level of public services 
that we would have enjoyed inside the Union. If 
we are to opt for independence then it will not be 
an easy ride and we should only do so with our 
eyes wide open. Suspect and inaccurate appraisals 
of our fiscal prospects are about as much use in the 
Scottish constitutional debate and to the Scottish 
people as a chocolate fireguard. 
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1/ Original SNP Scenario 
Income Measures 
"Fair Taxation" 
"Business Taxation" 
Expenditure Measures 
"Enterprise Development" 
"Education & Training " 
"Social Justice" 
"Overseas Aid" 
Balance of Income & Expenditure 
Additional Income Measures 
Relative Fiscal Surplus 
Savings from Employment Growth 
Increased Corporation Tax Revenues 
Defence Savings 
National Debt Reduction 
Total Additional Income 
Debt Repayment (Final Balance) 
Yearl 
1997/98 
200.0 
-112.5 
265.0 
218.0 
415.0 
48.0 
-858.5 
1100.0 
95.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
1250.0 
391.1 
Year 2 
1998/99 
30.0 
-205.0 
360.0 
242.0 
444.0 
96.0 
-1317.0 
1800.0 
280.0 
10.0 
55.0 
21.3 
2166.3 
849,25 _ 
Year 3 
1999/2000 
-40.0 
-297.5 
455.0 
265.0 
475.0 
144.0 
-1676.5 
2400.0 
435.0 
45.0 
55.0 
65.3 
3000.3 
1323.75 
Year 4 
2000/01 
-110.0 
-390.0 
655.0 
290.0 
504.0 
192.0 
-2141.0 
5400.0 
520.0 
80.0 
55.0 
135.0 
6190.0 
49A? 
Cumulat 
Total 
80.0 
-1005.0 
1735.0 
1015.0 
1838.0 
480.0 
-5993.0 
10700.0 
1330.0 
135.0 
220.0 
221.5 
12606.5 
... 6613.5 
2/ Scottish Office Fiscal Balance Scenario 
Income Measures 
"Fair Taxation" 
"Business Taxation" 
Expenditure Measures 
"Enterprise Development" 
"Education & Training " 
"Social Justice" 
"Overseas Aid" 
Balance 
Additional Income Measures 
Fiscal Deficit (present govt plans) 
Savings from Employment Growth 
Increased Corporation Tax Revenues 
Defence Savings 
National Debt Reduction 
Total 
Bill for Independence & Expanded Services 
Increased Interest Charges 
Borrowing Requirement 
Tax Rate Equivalent 
Yearl 
1997/98 
200.0 
-112.5 
265.0 
218.0 
415.0 
48.0 
-858.5 
-2486.1 
95.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-2336.1 
-3195 
0.0 
-3194.6 
21.0 
Year 2 
1998/99 
30.0 
-205.0 
360.0 
242.0 
444.0 
96.0 
-1317.0 
-2120.1 
280.0 
10.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-1775.1 
-3092.1 
-127.8 
-3219.9 
21.2 
Year 3 
1999/2000 
-40.0 
-297.5 
455.0 
265.0 
475.0 
144.0 
-1676.5 
-1801.0 
435.0 
45.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-1266.0 
-2942.46 
-123.7 
-3066.1 
20.2 
Year 4 
2000/0 
-110.0 
-390.0 
655.0 
290.0 
504.0 
192.0 
-2141.0 
-950.5 
520.0 
80.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-295.5 
-2436.5 
-117.7 
-2554.2 
16.8 
3/ Scottish Office Neutral Growth Scenario 
Income Measures 
"Fair Taxation" 
"Business Taxation" 
Expenditure Measures 
"Enterprise Development" 
"Education & Training " 
"Social Justice" 
"Overseas Aid" 
Balance 
Additional Income Measures 
Fiscal Deficit (present govt plans) 
Savings from Employment Growth 
Increased Corporation Tax Revenues 
Defence Savings 
National Debt Reduction 
Total 
Bill for Independence & Expanded Services 
Increased Interest Charges 
Borrowing Requirement 
Tax Rate Equivalent 
Yearl 
1997/98 
200.0 
-112.5 
265.0 
218.0 
415.0 
48.0 
-858.5 
-2486.1 
0.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-2431.1 
-3290 
0.0 
-3289.6 
21.6 
Year 2 
1998/99 
30.0 
-205.0 
360.0 
242.0 
444.0 
96.0 
-1317.0 
-2120.1 
0.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-2065.1 
-3382.1 
-131.6 
-3513.7 
23.1 
" Y e a r T 
_19??/2pop_ 
-40.0 
-297.5 
455.0 
265.0 
475.0 
144.0 
-1676.5 
-1801.0 
0.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-1746.0 
-3422.46 
-135.3 
-3557.7 
23.4 
Year 4 
2000/01 
-110.0 
-390.0 
655.0 
290.0 
504.0 
192.0 
-2141.0 
-950.5 
0.0 
0.0 
55.0 
0.0 
-895.5 
-3036.5 
-136.9 
-3173.4 
20.9 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1 
UK Pubic Finances (including Of Revenues S> 
Privatisation Proceeds) 
Ebn 
97/98 
M/99 
BOrtM 
United K n o d o m 
Oenaral 
O o v e m m s n t 
Expendfture 
(U 
319 
327 
336 
346 
1327 
Oeneral 
Government 
Revenue 
(1) 
299 
316 
333 
362 
1299 
Borrowing 
RsajuiremMt 
-19.6 
-12.0 
- 3 * 
7.0 
-28.4 
Privatisation 
Proceed* 
(PPs) 
(2) 
2.0 
1.S 
1.0 
1.0 
6.6 
Ofl 
Revenues 
(2) 
4.1 
3.6 
3.6 
16.2 
(1) Source: Redbook, 1997/98, Table 4.1 
(2) Source: Hansard, 6th February 1997, Cols 681,682 
Table A2 
UK Pubfic Finances (ex O i Revenues A Privatisation 
Proceeds) 
Eon 
Unied Kingdom 
97/98 
98/99 
99AM 
00/01 
Oeneral 
Government 
ExpendKure 
(ex PPS) 
321.0 
328.6 
337.6 
346.0 
1333.0 
Oeneral 
Government 
Revenue(ex 
O i Revenues) 
296.3 
311.1 
329.1 
348.4 
1283.9 
Borrowing 
Reqirirement 
(exOi 
Revenues & 
PPs) 
•26.7 
-17.4 
-8.4 
ZA 
-49.1 
Table A3 
Scottish Pubic Finances (excluding Oil Revenues S> 
Privatisation Proceeds) 
Ebn 
Scotland 
97/98 
98799 
99/00 
00/01 
Oeneral 
Government 
Expenditure 
(ex PPS) 
32.7 
33.6 
34.6 
36.4 
136.1 
General 
Government 
Revenue(ex 
Oil Revenues) 
26.4 
27.8 
29.4 
31.1 
114.6 
Borrowing 
Requirement 
(exOU 
Revenues & 
PPs) 
-6.4 
-6.8 
-6.1 
-4.3 
-21.6 
SNP Estimate 
(17.9% of UK 
Borrowing 
Requirement 
ex Oil 
Revenues <> 
PPs) 
•4.6 
-3.1 
-1.6 
0.4 
•8.8 
Table A4 
Scottish Pubic Finances (including Oil Revenues & 
Privatisation Proceeds) 
Ebn 
Scotland 
97/98 
98/99 
99/00 
00/01 
General 
Government 
Expenditure 
32.6 
33.4 
34.4 
36.3 
136.6 
General 
Government 
Revenue 
30.0 
31.3 
32.6 
34.3 
128.3 
Borrowing 
Requirement 
•2.6 
-2.1 
-1.8 
-1.0 
-7.4 
SNP Estimate 
(17.9% of UK 
Borrowing 
Requirement 
including Oil 
Revenues & 
PPs) 
-0.7 
0.6 
1.8 
3.8 
6.4 
Difference 
between 
estimates 
-1.8 
-2.6 
-3.6 
-4.7 
-12.7 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table AS 
Scottish Public Finances 
1979-1995 
Calculations Using Treasury & FAI Estimates 
79/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
Total 
UK GGBR (ex 
Oil & 
Privatisation 
Receipts) £bn 
m 
13.2 
17.5 
13.5 
15.9 
19.8 
23.3 
20.9 
14.1 
7.8 
-1.5 
0.0 
7.1 
22.8 
47.3 
53.5 
45.8 
Scotlands 
share (%) 
(2) 
15 
17 
12 
17 
15 
13 
14 
21 
50 
0 
0 
57 
22 
17 
17 
17 
Scottish 
Share of UK 
GGBR (ex 
PPs & Oil 
Revenues) 
£bn 
2.0 
3.0 
1.6 
2.7 
3.0 
3.0 
2.9 
3.0 
3.9 
1.1 
2.0 
4.0 
5.0 
8.0 
9.1 
7.8 
Scottish 
Share of 
Privatisation 
Proceeds 
(PPs)£bn 
(D 
0.1 
0.1 
-1.8 
-2.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.4 
0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.6 
90% of 
North Sea 
Oil 
Revenues 
£bn 
(3) 
2.1 
3.3 
5.9 
7.0 
7.9 
10.8 
10.2 
4.3 
4.1 
2.9 
2.2 
2.1 
0.9 
1.2 
1.1 
1.4 
GGR 
Oi 
Reven 
&PP 
£b 
-0. 
-0. 
-2. 
-2. 
-5. 
-8. 
-7. 
- 1 . 
-0. 
-2. 
-0. 
1.5 
3.4 
6.1 
7.5 
5
-8 
-6, 
(1) Source: Public Finance Trends 1996 
(2) Source: Hansard 21 March 1997 Cols 968,969 
(3) Source: Government Expenditure & Revenue in Scotland, 1994/95, Table 9, pp27 
(4) Source: GDP Deflator derived from 1997/98 Redbook, Table 5A.1 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A6 
Scottish Public Finances 
1979-1995 
SNP Calculations 
79/80 
80/81 
81/82 
82/83 
83/84 
84/85 
85/86 
86/87 
87/88 
88/89 
89/90 
90/91 
91/92 
92/93 
93/94 
94/95 
total 
UK GGBR (ex 
Oil & 
Privatisation 
Receipts) £bn 
(1) 
13.2 
17.5 
13.5 
15.9 
19.8 
23.3 
20.9 
14.1 
7.8 
-1.5 
0.0 
7.1 
22.8 
47.3 
53.5 
45.8 
Scotiands 
(@17.9%) 
2.4 
3.1 
2.4 
2.8 
3.5 
4.2 
3.7 
2.5 
1.4 
-0.3 
0.0 
1.3 
4.1 
8.5 
9.6 
8.2 
Scottish 
Share of 
Privatisation 
Proceeds 
(PPs) £bn 
(1) 
0.1 
0.1 
-1.8 
-2.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 
0.4 
0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.6 
90% of North 
Sea Oil 
Revenues 
£bn 
(1) 
2.1 
3.3 
5.9 
7.0 
7.9 
10.8 
10.2 
4.3 
4.1 
2.9 
2.2 
2.1 
0.9 
1.2 
1.1 
1.4 
GGR (inc 
Oil 
Revenues 
& PPs)£bn 
(3) 
0.2 
-0.3 
-1.7 
-2.1 
-4.5 
-6.8 
-6.7 
-2.2 
-3.2 
-3.7 
-2.5 
-1.2 
2.5 
6.6 
8.0 
6.2 
-11.3 
GG 
Rev 
& 
9 
pric 
-
-
-
(1) Source: Public Finance Trends 1996 
(2) Source: Scottish Nationalist Party 
(3) Source: Government Expenditure & Revenue in Scotland, 1994/95, Table 9, pp2 
(4) Source: GDP Deflator derived from 1997/98 Redbook, Table 5A.1 
